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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS MALEK, : 
Plaintiff/Appellantf : 
District Court No. C-85-2595 
-v- : Supreme Court No. 21052 
Category No. 3 
KEN SHULSEN and GARY WEBSTER, : 
Respondents/Appellees. : 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether petitioner's claims are barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations? 
2. Whether petitioner is entitled to immediate release 
from the Utah State Prison absent a showing that he was prejudiced 
by the Board of Pardons' delay in conducting his initial parole 
hearing or his parole revocation hearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of habeas 
corpus filed in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 18, 1977, petitioner pled guilty to a charge of 
manslaughter arising out of the beating death of a six year old 
boy. (R. 29) . He was sentenced to serve one to fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison (R. 3). After serving approximately five 
years of his sentence, petitioner was paroled on May 11, 1982. 
(R. 29). Less than ten months later, petitioner was arrested by 
the Provo City Pol ice Department and charged with attempted murder 
and aggravated robbery. (R. 1 2 , 3 0 ) . Based upon the f i l i n g of 
criminal charges aga ins t p e t i t i o n e r , the Board of Pardons issued a 
warrant for h i s arres t on March 18 , 1983 and charged him with 
v i o l a t i n g the terms and condi t ions of h i s parole . (R. 3 0 ) . On 
that same dayf p e t i t i o n e r was served with the Board's warrant and 
waived h i s r ight t o a prerevocation hearing. He was transported 
t o the Utah State Prison t o await t r i a l on the criminal charges. 
(R. 1 2 , 3 0 ) . The Board of Pardons scheduled p e t i t i o n e r ' s hearing 
for Apri l 1 3 , 1983. The hearing was subsequently continued by the 
Board pending d i s p o s i t i o n of the criminal charges. (R. 32) . 
On July 8 , 1983 f p e t i t i o n e r was convicted of aggravated 
robbery and attempted murder and sentenced by Fourth D i s t r i c t 
Judge Alan Sorenson to serve two concurrent sentences of f i v e 
years t o l i f e a t the Utah State Prison. (R. 3 0 ) . The Board of 
Pardons received a copy of the Fourth D i s t r i c t Court's order on 
May 16 , 1984, and scheduled a parole hearing for May 23 , 1984. 
(R. 1 2 , 30 ) . Pe t i t i oner objected t o the scheduled hearing date on 
the grounds that he had not had adequate time to prepare for the 
hearing. Accordingly, at p e t i t i o n e r ' s request , the hearing was 
rescheduled for July 25 , 1984. He appeared before the Board on 
that date , pled g u i l t y t o the parole v i o l a t i o n charges and was 
granted a parole rehearing date of Ju ly , 1988. (R. 31) . 
Over nine months l a t e r , p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d an app l i ca t ion 
for a wri t of habeas corpus, claiming that the hearing conducted 
on July 25 , 1984, was not conducted in a timely manner, and 
there fore , he was e n t i t l e d to immediate re l ease from the Utah 
State Prison. (R. 2 ) . 
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The d i s t r i c t court denied the p e t i t i o n on the grounds 
that p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim was barred by the s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s 
and that p e t i t i o n e r had not been prejudiced by the delay in 
conducting the parole hearing. (R. 40, 42) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
P e t i t i o n e r ' s claims are based upon two d i f f e r e n t 
t h e o r i e s . F i r s t , that the Board of Pardons f a i l e d to conduct a 
timely parole grant hearing as required by Utah Code Ann. § 
7-27-7 and second, that the Board f a i l e d to conduct a timely 
parole revocation hearing as required by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972) . 
Respondents contend that regardless of whether the Board 
f a i l e d to conduct the parole hearings in a timely manner, that 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s claims are barred by the three month s ta tu te of 
l i m i t a t i o n s which governs the t i l i n g of habeas corpus c laims. 
(Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 1 2 - 3 1 . 1 ) . This provis ion operates as a bar 
to p e t i t i o n e r ' s claims despi te p e t i t i o n e r ' s attempt t o 
character ize h i s i n j u r i e s as ongoing in nature and desp i te the 
ex i s t ence of a s tatutory provis ion which t o l l s the running of the 
l i m i t a t i o n period whi le p e t i t i o n e r i s imprisoned. P e t i t i o n e r ' s 
attempts to defeat the l i m i t a t i o n period are contrary to bas ic 
ru le s of s tatutory construct ion and bas ic l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s which 
e s t a b l i s h when a cause of ac t ion accrues . 
The t o l l i n g s t a t u t e was enacted in 1975 and contains 
general language appl icable t o a l l types of l e g a l claims f i l e d by 
ind iv idua l s who are imprisoned. By contrast , the l i m i t a t i o n 
period governing habeas corpus claims was enacted in 1979 and 
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applies spec i f i ca l ly to habeas corpus claims. Therefore, the 
three month statute of l imitations controls over the previously 
enacted and more general language of the to l l ing provision and 
consequently operates as a bar to pet i t ioner's claims. 
Alternatively, even if pet i t ioner ' s claims were not 
barred by the statute of l imitat ions , petit ioner i s required to 
show that he was prejudiced by the delay in conducting the parole 
hearings before he i s ent i t led to re l i e f in the form of an order 
directing h is release from imprisonment. The requirement of 
establishing prejudice as a condition precedent to release i s 
firmly established in both state and federal jurisdict ions , as 
well as the State of Utah. 
In the present case, petit ioner appeared before the 
Board on charges of v iolat ing the conditions of his parole. Yet, 
petit ioner fa i led to produce any evidence at either the fact-
finding or disposit ional phase of that hearing. Instead, 
petit ioner plead guilty to the parole v io lat ion charges based upon 
the intervening criminal convictions. Therefore, petitioner can 
not contend that the delay in conducting the hearing deprived him 
of the testimony of c r i t i c a l witnesses or any other form of 
mitigating evidence, since petitioner did not attempt to present 
any evidence at the Board hearing. 
Accordingly, petitioner has fa i led to establish that he 
was prejudiced by the delay in conducting his parole hearings and 
consequently, petitioner i s not ent i t led to release. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT 
PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
I t i s a genera l p r i n c i p l e of law t h a t a s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s commences running when the cause of a c t i o n has accrued 
or the r i g h t t o commence l e g a l a c t i o n comes i n t o e x i s t e n c e . 
G e n e r a l l y , a cause of a c t i o n a c c r u e s when a wrong or in ju ry has 
been s u s t a i n e d . See Ash v . S t a t e . 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977) and 
Xplman y, R-Mart E n t e r p r i s e r InCt r 560 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1977) . 
Accordingly/ once a i n d i v i d u a l has s u s t a i n e d a wrongf he i s 
e n t i t l e d t o commence l e g a l a c t i o n w i t h i n a s t a t u t o r i l y p r e s c r i b e d 
per iod of time and f a i l u r e t o commence s u i t w i t h i n the a p p r o p r i a t e 
t ime w i l l r e s u l t in a den ia l of t h a t c la im. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31 .1 i s the s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s governing w r i t s of habeas co rpus . That s e c t i o n 
p rov ides a s f o l l o w s : 
Within t h r e e months: For r e l i e f pursuan t t o a 
w r i t of habeas corpus . This l i m i t a t i o n s h a l l 
apply not only as t o grounds known t o 
p e t i t i o n e r but a l s o t o grounds which in the 
e x e r c i s e of r easonab le d i l i g e n c e should have 
been known by p e t i t i o n e r or counsel for 
p e t i t i o n e r . 
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , p e t i t i o n e r has based h i s w r i t of 
habeas corpus upon two s e p a r a t e c l a ims . F i r s t , p e t i t i o n e r c la ims 
t h a t he was denied a p a r o l e g r an t hea r ing or a da t e for t h a t 
hea r ing w i t h i n s i x months of h i s commitment t o the Utah S t a t e 
P r i s o n . P e t i t i o n e r ' s c o n t e n t i o n i s based upon Utah Code Ann. § 
77-27-7 which provides: 
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(1) The Board of Pardons s h a l l determine 
within s i x months after the date of an 
of fender ' s commitment for a felony o f fense , a 
date upon which the offender sha l l be afforded 
a hearing t o e s t a b l i s h a date of re lease or a 
date for a rehearing, and sha l l promptly 
not i fy the offender of the date . 
(Emphasis added). 
On March 18, 1983, p e t i t i o n e r was transported t o the 
Utah State Prison pursuant to a Board warrant. On July 8 f 1983, 
he was committed t o the Utah State Prison by Fourth D i s t r i c t Court 
Judge Alan Sorenson to serve two concurrent sentences of f i v e 
years t o l i f e . Although p e t i t i o n e r i n i t i a l l y appeared before the 
Board on April 1 3 , 1983, he was not given a re l ease date a t the 
time nor was h i s case heard by the Board. For purposes of the 
s t a t u t e , p e t i t i o n e r f i r s t appeared before the Board on July 25, 
1984. 
Thus, the ques t ion i s when did p e t i t i o n e r ' s cause of 
ac t ion accrue. P e t i t i o n e r was transported t o the Prison on March 
18 , 1983 on parole v i o l a t i o n charges, but was not a c t u a l l y 
committed to the Prison "for a felony offense" u n t i l July 8 , 1983. 
Thus, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-7 c i t e d above, i t i s the 
commitment date of July 8 , 1983 which i s used to c a l c u l a t e the s i x 
month hearing date . Under that a n a l y s i s , the p e t i t i o n e r should 
have been heard by the Board of Pardons no l a t e r than January 8, 
1984. I t was on t h i s date that p e t i t i o n e r ' s cause of ac t ion 
accrued because i t was a t t h i s point in time that p e t i t i o n e r had 
the r i g h t to commence l e g a l ac t ion . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31 .1 c i t e d above, l i m i t s the 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s r ight to f i l e an a p p l i c a t i o n for a wri t of habeas 
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corpus t o three months from the time h i s cause of act ion accrued. 
This means that p e t i t i o n e r had from January 8 , 1984 to April 8, 
1984 to commence l e g a l act ion chal lenging the v a l i d i t y of h i s 
confinement. However, as discussed above, i t was more than one 
year l a t e r , on May 5 , 1985, that pe t i t i oner f i n a l l y f i l e d h i s 
a p p l i c a t i o n . Thus, the t r i a l court was correct in f inding that 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim was untimely and barred by the s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s . 
P e t i t i o n e r ' s second claim i s that h i s parole revocation 
hearing was not conducted in a timely manner as required by 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471 (1972). in Morrissey, the 
Supreme Court held that a parolee detained on parole v i o l a t i o n 
charges was e n t i t l e d t o a revocation hearing within a reasonable 
period of time. The Court a l so held that 6 0 days was not per se 
unreasonable. However, beyond t h i s general gu ide l ine , the court 
did not spec i fy an exact period of time within which a revocation 
hearing must be held. Pe t i t ioner contends that i t i s per se 
unreasonable to conduct a revocation hearing more than 90 days 
a f t er a parolee i s taken i n t o custody. Assuming for purposes of 
argument, that p e t i t i o n e r ' s contention i s correct and that the 90 
day period i s c o n t r o l l i n g , p e t i t i o n e r ' s revocation hearing should 
have been conducted no l a t e r than October 9 , 1983; 90 days after 
h i s commitment t o the Utah State Prison. Thus, p e t i t i o n e r ' s cause 
of ac t ion accrued on October 9 , 1983 and he had 3 months from that 
date unt i l January 9 , 1984 to f i l e h i s app l i ca t ion for a wr i t . 
However, i t was not unt i l almost a year and a half l a t e r , May, 
1985, that p e t i t i o n e r f i n a l l y f i l e d h i s claim for r e l i e f . Thus, 
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the t r ia l court was correct in finding that pet i t ioner 's second 
claim was also untimely and barred by the statute of l imitat ions , 
Petit ioner f however, seeks to avoid application of the 
three month l imitation period by characterizing his injury as 
ongoing in nature, i . e . , unlawful incarceration. Petitioner then 
contends that because his injury i s ongoing, the statute of 
l imitat ions begins to run anew each day that he i s detained. 
Pet i t ioner's contention, however, ignores basic legal principles 
which establish when a cause of action accrues. A cause of action 
accrues and a statute of l imitations commences running when the 
injured party has the right to bring an action to enforce his 
rights. An injury cannot be characterized as ongoing in nature 
simply because the injured party continues to suffer the 
consequences of the i n i t i a l wrongful conduct. If pet i t ioner 's 
contention were accurate, the statute of l imitat ions would not 
commence running in a personal injury sui t until the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
physical injuries had healed. Obviously, neither the l eg i s la ture 
or the courts intended such a result . 
Moreover, even i f pet i t ioner 's contention were correct 
and pet i t ioner 's injury was ongoing, the i l l ega l condition, i . e . , 
the fa i lure to conduct a timely hearing, was remedied in July, 
19 84 when the Board of Pardons conducted a consolidated i n i t i a l 
and parole revocation hearing. Thus, the i l l e g a l condition of 
confinement was removed at that time and petit ioner was no longer 
detained unlawfully. Therefore, pet i t ioner 's cause of action 
accrued no later than July, 1984, and under the three month 
l imitat ion periodr petitioner was required to commence suit by 
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October, 1984. Yet even under t h i s quest ionable l i n e of 
reasoning, p e t i t i o n e r waited s i x months beyond t h i s date t o 
commence s u i t and there fore , the l i m i t a t i o n period s t i l l operates 
as a bar t o h i s c la ims. 
Pe t i t ioner a l s o contends that the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s 
governing the f i l i n g of habeas corpus p e t i t i o n s i s not contro l l ing 
in t h i s instance because the l i m i t a t i o n period i s t o l l e d during 
the period of p e t i t i o n e r ' s incarcerat ion . The t o l l i n g s t a t u t e i s 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 and provides , in pert inent 
part , as f o l l o w s : 
If a person e n t i t l e d t o bring an a c t i o n , other 
than for recovery of real property, i s a t the 
time the cause of act ion accrued e i t h e r : 
* * * 
(3) imprisoned on a criminal charge or in 
execution under the sentence of a criminal 
court for a term l e s s than for l i f e ; 
The time ot such d i s a b i l i t y i s not a part of 
the time l i m i t for the commencement of that 
a c t i o n . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1953 as amended 1975) . 
I t i s a wel l e s tab l i shed pr inc ip le of s ta tutory 
construct ion , that where two s t a t u t e s are in apparent c o n f l i c t , 
the more recent enactment i s c o n t r o l l i n g . Murray City v. Hal l , 
663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) . In the present case , the l i m i t a t i o n 
period governing habeas corpus claims i s a more recent enactment 
than the general t o l l i n g prov i s ion . The general t o l l i n g provis ion 
was enacted in 1975 and c l o s e l y para l l e l ed an e a r l i e r enactment. 
The l i m i t a t i o n period for habeas corpus claims was enacted in 
1979. Thus, the three month l i m i t a t i o n period enacted in 1979 
contro l s over the previously enacted t o l l i n g s t a t u t e . 
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In add i t ion , t h i s Court has concluded that narrowly 
drawn, s p e c i f i c language in an act contro l s over the more general , 
comprehensive language of an a c t . Rammel v. Smith. 56 0 P.2d 1108 
(Utah 1977); Qsuala v. Aetna Life and Casualty. 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 
1980) . The t o l l i n g prov i s ion contained in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-36 (1975) governs prisoners and l e g a l claims genera l ly . By 
c o n t r a s t , the l e g i s l a t u r e has enacted a very s p e c i f i c l i m i t a t i o n 
period for habeas corpus p e t i t i o n s . Again, applying bas ic 
p r i n c i p l e s of s tatutory construct ion , i t i s ev ident that the 
s p e c i f i c l i m i t a t i o n period enacted for habeas corpus claims 
contro l s over the more general language of the t o l l i n g s t a t u t e . 
F i n a l l y , t h i s Court has s ta ted that s t a t u t e s should be 
construed in a l o g i c a l manner to avoid i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which may 
be confusing or which would render tne s t a t u t e meaningless . 
Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, I n c , 575 p.2d 1044 (Utah 1978). it-
p e t i t i o n e r ' s in t erpre ta t ion i s correct and the s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s on a habeas corpus claim does not commence running 
unt i l the prisoner i s re l eased , the p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim would be 
moot, s ince the r e l i e f sought in an app l i ca t ion for habeas corpus 
i s e i ther re l ease or removal of the unlawful condi t ions of 
confinement. Accordingly, the l i m i t a t i o n period for f i l i n g w r i t s 
of habeas corpus would be rendered meaningless s ince there would 
be no l i m i t a t i o n period a t a l l . 
A s imi lar r e s u l t was re jec ted by t h i s Court in Spflin Vt 
Stewart. 639 P.2d 166 (Utah 1981), where the p l a i n t i f f , a 
probationer, brought a p e t i t i o n for a wri t of habeas corpus 
protes t ing the l e g a l i t y of h i s confinement in a county 3 a i l . He 
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claimed that he had not been timely taken before the magistrate 
for a bail hearing and had not been provided with a written 
statement of the alleged probation v io lat ion. The d i s tr i c t court 
heard the pet i t ion and ordered that the petitioner be taken before 
a magistrate and bail fixed. Bail was promptly set and the 
petit ioner was released. When the d i s tr i c t court learned that 
petitioner had been released on bai l , i t dismissed the habeas 
corpus pet i t ion because the case was moot. The petitioner 
appealed t h i s decision, claiming that the issue was not moot 
because he remained under the res tr ic t ive conditions of bai l . 
This court disagreed and held that once the preliminary hearing 
was held and bail f ixed, the i l l ega l condition had been removed 
and the case was, therefore, moot. Thus, th i s Court has evidenced 
a clear intent to consider pet i t ions for habeas corpus only when 
the judicial re l ief sought wi l l actually affect the rights of the 
l i t i g a n t s . Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981). A contrary 
interpretation of the l eg i s l a t i on would utterly defeat such a 
result . 
Therefore, applying these basic principles of statutory 
construction to the present case, i t i s evident that pet i t ioner's 
interpretation of the confl ict ing statutes i s erroneous. Such an 
interpretation i s i l l og i ca l and renders the l imitation period 
placed on f i l i n g habeas corpus pet i t ions meaningless. Moreover, 
i t completely undermines the l eg i s la ture ' s intent to spec i f ica l ly 
l imit the time frame for f i l i n g these types of claims because 
under pet i t ioner 's interpretation, there would be no l imitat ion at 
a l l . 
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Finally, pe t i t ioner ' s interpretat ion of the legis la t ion 
ignores the r e a l i t i e s of a modern correctional system and the fact 
that the rat ionale underlying the enactment of the to l l ing s ta tu te 
no longer applies. The to l l ing s ta tu te was enacted during a 
period of time when prisoners faced insurmountable legal and 
practical d i f f icu l t ies in in i t i a t ing and prosecuting claims. In 
addition, prisoners were considered to be "stripped" of their 
c ivi l r ights and thereby lacked the legal capacity to sue. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-37 (1953f repealed 1973) and Major v. 
Arizona State Prison, 642 P.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1981). Prisoners 
today no longer operate under these d i s ab i l i t i e s . Prisoners have 
the legal capacity to sue and are constitutionally guaranteed 
access to the courts. In fact, s ta te prisoners in Utah are 
provided with direct access to legal counsel to a ss i s t them in the 
preparation of thei r claims and the in i t i a t ion of legal action. 
Therefore, application of the to l l ing s ta tu te in the context of 
habeas corpus claims i s unwarranted under these circumstances. 
In summary, the t r i a l court was correct in i t s 
determination tha t pe t i t ioner ' s claims are barred by the three 
month s ta tute of l imitat ions. Neither the nature of the injury or 
the to l l ing provisions contained in Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-36 
afford peti t ioner rel ief from that provision. 
POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT 
ABSENT A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE, PETITIONER IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO RELEASE. 
P e t i t i o n e r c la ims t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n 
r e q u i r i n g t he p e t i t i o n e r t o show t h a t he was p re jud i ced by the 
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Board's f a i l u r e to conduct t imely parole hearings . As a 
consequence, p e t i t i o n e r maintains that he i s e n t i t l e d t o immediate 
re l ease from prison. Utah Code Ann. S 77-27-11 i s the s ta tu te 
governing the revocat ion of parole in Utah. The s t a t u t e , however, 
does not spec i fy the period of time within which a revocation 
hearing must be he ld . 
In Morrissey v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471 (1972) , the Supreme 
Court held that a parole revocat ion hearing must be conducted 
wi th in a reasonable period of time of the paro lee 1 s detent ion . In 
mandating t h i s hearing, however, the Court decl ined t o adopt a 
r i g i d t ime frame for a l l revocation hearings and s t a t e d : "We 
cannot wr i te a code of procedure; that i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
each S t a t e . " Id. at 488. Instead, the Court s e t forth the 
general requirement that the hearing must be held within a 
reasonable period of time. 
What c o n s t i t u t e s a reasonable period of time i s far from 
s e t t l e d among the lower courts . Contrary t o the argument asser ted 
in p e t i t i o n e r ' s br ie f , ninety days i s not considered "per se 
unreasonable." See, e . g . , S tate v. Percy, 99 Wis.2d 459, 299< 
N.W.2d 886 (Ct. App. 1980) . However, rather than adopting a 
s p e c i f i c standard, most courts , both s t a t e and f e d e r a l , look t o 
the indiv idual circumstances of the case in determining whether a 
delay in conducting a revocat ion hearing i s unreasonable. See, 
e . g . , Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 476 A.2d 1308 (Pa. Super. 1984) 
(delay of three months i s not unreasonable when there i s no 
showing of mal ice ) ; Commonwealth v. Whi t f i e ld . 421 A.2d 1142 (Pa. 
Super. 1980) (delay of over four months after convic t ion for new 
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offense i s not unreasonable); State v . Percy, supra ( t r i a l court 
has d i s c r e t i o n t o decide i f seven month delay i s unreasonable). 
In f a c t , at l e a s t one court has found that the requirement that 
revocat ion hearings be held wi th in a reasonable time i s appl icable 
only when the parolee i s returned t o custody s o l e l y for a parole 
v i o l a t i o n . Semick v. Department of Correct ions , 447 A.2d 707 
(Del. Super. 1984) . 
Howeverr regardless of whether the delay in conducting 
the parole hearings in t h i s case was unreasonable f respondents 
contend that the appropriate remedy in the case of a procedural 
de f i c i ency i s t o remedy that de f i c i ency f not t o r e l e a s e the 
p e t i t i o n e r . Habeas corpus i s an extraordinary wri t f and an order 
of r e l ease pursuant t o i t should be granted only when other 
remedies are unavai lable . Applicat ion of Downing, 103 Idaho 689 f 
652 P.2d 193 (1982) . 
This Court has held tha t habeas corpus p e t i t i o n s w i l l be 
granted only when the p e t i t i o n e r can show "substantial and 
p r e j u d i c i a l denial of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ight to due process of 
law." Morishita v. Morris, 621 P.2d 691 (Utah 1980) . In 
Morishita, the p l a i n t i f f was charged with v i o l a t i n g the condi t ions 
of probation and committed t o the Utah State Prison to serve the 
remainder of h i s sentence . The Courtf howeverf f a i l e d t o make 
wr i t t en f ind ings of f a c t or conclus ions of law, as mandated by 
Rule 52 (a)
 f Utah Rules of Civ i l Procedure. 
Even though the t r i a l court had c l e a r l y v i o l a t e d a 
s ta tutory requirement t h i s court denied habeas corpus r e l i e f f 
f inding that an ac t ion for the extraordinary writ "will not l i e in 
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the absence of a claim of fundamental unfairness in the t r i a l or a 
s u b s t a n t i a l and pre jud ic ia l denial of a person1 s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r i g h t s . " Id. at 693. The error of f a i l i n g t o enter f indings of 
f a c t and conclusions of law did not r i s e t o that l e v e l . 
The requirement of e s t a b l i s h i n g prejudice i s widely 
accepted i n the context of proving a procedural v i o l a t i o n which 
warrants the re l ease of a prisoner. Contrary to the p e t i t i o n e r ' s 
a s s e r t i o n s , t h i s ru le i s found in both s t a t e and federal court 
d e c i s i o n s . See f e . g . , Smith v. Dnited S t a t e s . 577 P.2d 1025 (5th 
Cir. 1978); Carmel v. United States Parole Commission. 489 F. Supp. 
113 (S.D.N. Y. 1980); In Re Caudi l lo , 164 Cal. Rptr. 692 f 610 P.2d 
1021 (1980); In Hatter of KnPke, 17 Wash. App. 874, 565 P.2d 1187 
(1977); Carrion v. S t a t e , 113 Ariz. 303, 552 P.2d 1197 (1976) . 
For example, in Sacasas v. Rison, 755 F.2d 1533 (11th 
Cir. 1985) , the p e t i t i o n e r was granted parole a f ter serving ten 
years of h i s sentence. Several years l a t e r , the p e t i t i o n e r was 
arrested on drug charges and the Parole Commission revoked h i s 
parole . Pet i t ioner brought a habeas corpus a c t i o n , contending 
tha t the Commission f a i l e d t o hold a "termination of supervis ion 
hearing" f i v e years a f ter h i s re l ease on parole as required by 
federal s t a t u t e . The Commission conceded that i t had indeed 
f a i l e d t o hold the hearing wi th in the s t a t u t o r i l y prescribed 
period. Despite t h i s f a i l u r e , however, the Eleventh Circuit Court 
looked t o the l i k e l y outcome of the termination hearing, assuming 
that a t imely hearing had been held . The Court concluded tha t 
given the paro lee 1 s v i o l a t i o n s of the condi t ions of parole , the 
Commission would not have terminated superv i s ion . Based on t h i s 
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conclusion the court found that the Commission's fa i lure to hold 
the hearing did not result in any actual prejudice to the 
pet i t ioner. Because no prejudice was shown, the court found that 
the appropriate remedy was not release, but a mandate to the 
Commission to hold the hearing. See a lso , Carmel, supra, (where 
the Parole Commission fa i l ed to conduct a revocation hearing 
within the s tatutori ly prescribed period of time. The Court held 
that the "appropriate remedy was not release from custody but the 
compulsion of a prompt decision by the Commission." 489 F.Supp. 
at 115). 
While i t i s true that the federal decisions rely to a 
certain extent on federal l e g i s l a t i o n and i t s history, the 
underlying reasoning of those decisions applies to state 
procedures as wel l . It would be entirely unprecedented to 
conclude that whenever a minor v io lat ion in statutory procedures 
or due process occurs that release from confinement i s mandated. 
This i s particularly true where l e s s drastic means would remedy or 
a l l ev ia te the alleged injury. This court has expressed i t s 
hes i tat ion to grant habeas corpus re l ie f or to intrude into the 
operations or management of the internal affairs of the prison; 
and wi l l do so "only in an unusual exigency where i t appears that 
there i s a l ikel ihood that some such oppression or injust ice i s 
occurring that i t would be unconscionable not to examine into the 
alleged grievance." z iegler v. Miliken. 583 P.2d 1175 (Dtah 
1978) . 
In the present case, petitioner has not been prejudiced 
by the delay in the revocation hearing or the i n i t i a l hearing. 
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Petitioner has not shown that any evidence was unavailable to him, 
that witnesses disappeared or that memories of key events faded. 
Indeed, petitioner did not even attempt to introduce any evidence 
at the Board hearing. Petitioner simply pled guilty to the 
charges based upon the criminal convictions and the Board decided 
to revoke his parole and set a rehearing date for the future. 
Moreover, even i f the hearing had been conducted in a timely 
manner, i t i s inconceivable that the Board of Pardons would have 
reinstated pet i t ioner ' s parole given the serious nature of the 
offenses which petitioner committed while on parole. Thus, the 
t r i a l court was correct in refusing to grant pet i t ioner's re l ie f 
absent a showing of prejudice. 
Finally, petitioner claims that the Board fa i led to 
promptly notify him of i t s decision to revoke his parole. 
However, the statute requiring prompt not i f icat ion does not define 
what constitutes "prompt" not i f icat ion and petit ioner f a i l s to 
c i t e any case law to support his claim. 
However, even if the notice of the decision were 
def ic ient , i t i s clear under Morishita, supra, that the proper 
remedy i s to correct the notice, not to release the petit ioner. 
See a lso , People ex re l , Hagkins yg Waters, 87 A.2d 657, 448 
N.Y. S.2d 513 (1982) . 
In summary, the petitioner has fa i l ed to show that he 
was prejudiced by the Board's fai lure to conduct a timely hearing 
or the fa i lure to provide him with prompt not i f icat ion of the 
decision to revoke. Accordingly, the petit ioner i s not ent i t l ed 
to release. 
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CONCLUSION 
The p e t i t i o n e r ' s a p p l i c a t i o n for a wri t of habeas corpus 
was properly denied by the lower court because i t was barred by 
the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s and because p e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d to show 
that he was prejudiced by the Board's delay in conducting a parole 
hearing. Accordingly f the t r i a l court 1 s dec i s ion should be 
affirmed and p e t i t i o n e r ' s w r i t dismissed. 
Dated t h i s ^ day of Apri l , 1986. 
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appel lees 
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